Exchange-Rate Policy After a Decade of "Floating" by William H. Branson
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
EXCHANGE—RATE POLICY AFTER A DECADE OF "FLOATING"
William H. Branson
Working Paper No. 909




This is a revision of a paper presented at the NBER Conference on
Exchange Rates, January 25—29, 1982, Bellaglo, Italy. Not for
quotation; comments 'welcome. The research reported here is part of
the NBER's research program in International Studies. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author and not those of the National
Bureauof Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #909
June 1982
Exchange—Pate Policy After a Decade of "Floating't
ABSTRACT
This paper integrates exchange—rate policy into a model of exchange—
rate behavior, and examines the data econometrically to infer hypotheses
about policy behavior in the 1970s. The model shows how unanticipated
movements in money, the current account, and relative price levels will
cause first a jump in the exchange rate, and then a movement along a
"saddle path" to the new long run equilibrium. Here the role of "news"
in moving the exchange rate is clear. The model is used to analyze the
options available to the central bank that wants to reduce the jump in
the exchange rate following a real or monetary disturbance. The distinc-
tion is made between monetary policy and sterilized intervention, and a
regime in which the domestic interest rate is used as the policy vari-
able is also studied. Systems of vector autoregressions (VARs) for each
of four countries——the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Japan——are estimated,
and the correlations among their residuals are studied. These represent
the "innovations," or "news" in the time series. A clear, pattern emerges
in these correlations, in which policy in the U.S. and to a lesser extent
Japan, drives exchange rates, and policy in Germany and the U.K. reacts.
It appears that U.S. monetary policy is essentially determined by domestic
considerations, with the exchange rate moving as a consequence. In Japan,
interest rates are varied in response to movement in the current—account
and relative price levels, and the effects on the exchange rate are par-
tially neutralized by sterilized intervention. Germany and the U.K. re-
act to movements in their exchange rates by moving interest rates, and
sterilized intervention.
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I. Introduction aridSunimarv
During the 1970s an extensive theoretical literature has developed
analyzing market determination of freely floating exchange rates. At the
same time, there has been extensive and continuous interventionin the
market by central banks. Exchange rates have not been floating freely;
they have been managed, or manipulated, by central banks. However, most
of the description of exchange rate policy, as actually practiced has been
informal,or"literary," not integrated with the formal theoretical litera-
ture. Recent examples are the surveys in Branson (1980) and ussa(1981).
Rather than reproduce Mussa's excellent review, in this paper I in-
tegrate exchange—rate policy into a model of exchange—rate behavior,and
examine the data econometrically, to infer hypotheses about policy be-
havior in the 1970s. I focus on four major currencies, the U.S. dollar,
the Deutschemark, Sterling, and the Japanese yen, and analyze movements
in their effective (weighted) exchange rates as calculated by theI' for
their relative cost arid price data.
In section II a model of market determination of a floating exchange—
rate is laid out. It is a rational—expectations versionof the model in
Branson (1977), and it draws on the model of Kouri(1978). Themodel
shows how unanticipated movements in money, the current account,and rela—
tive price levels vii]. cause first a jump in the exchange rate, and then
amovement along a "saddle path" to the new long run equilibrium.Here
therole of "news" in moving the exchange rate, as recently emphasizedby2.
Dornbusch(1980) and Frenkel (1981) is clear. The model ernphasizes ier—
fect substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds, in order to pre—
pare for the analysis of intervention policy in section III.
Exchange—rate policy is introduced in section III. We analyze the
options available to the central bank that wants to reduce the jump in the
exchange rate following a real or monetary disturbance——"news" about the
current account, relative prices, or money. This is the policy character-
ized as "leaning against the wind" in Branson (1976). The distinction is
made between monetarypolicyand sterilized intervention. We also study
a regime in which the domestic interest rate is used as the policy variable.
Insections IV and Vwe turn to the data. These are described system-
atically in section IV, wherewe investigate thetime—series properties of
the exchange rate, money, realtive prices, and the current account, the
short—term interest rate, and reserves for each of the four countries. It
is difficult to sarize these data, but the time—series behavior of ex-
change rates, money, relative prices, and current—account balances are
roughly consistent with the model of section II.
In section V we estimate system.s ofvector autoregressions (VARs)for
each of the countries, and study the correlations among their residuals.
These represent the "innovations," or "news" in the time series. A clear
pattern emerges in these correlations, in which policy in the U.S.and to
a lesser extent Japa; drives exchange rates, and policy in Geiany and the
1LK. reacts. It appears that U.S. monetary policy is essentially deter—
mined by domestic considerations, with the exchange rate moving as a conse-
quence. In Japan, interest rates are varied in response to movementin the3.
current—account and relative price levels, and the effects on the exchange
rate are partially neutralized by sterlized intervention. Ger.anyandthe
U.K. react to movements in their exchange rates by moving interest rates,
andsterlizedintervention.14.
II. An Asset—Market Model with Rational Expectations
II.A. Introduction
The purpose of this section is to lay out a simple asset—market model
of exchange—rate determination within which, in the next section, monetary
policy reaction to movements in the exchange rate can be analyzed. The
literature of the l970s has identified three principal macroeconomic vari-
ables that influence movements in exchange rates. These are money supplies,
relative price levels, and current—account balances. Here I develop a re-
presentative model that explicitly includes all three elements. The model
is an extension of the asset—market model sketched in Branson (1975) ,and
developed in full in Branson (1977). It is a close relative of Kouri
(1978). In the early versions of this model the focus was on the roles of
relative prices and asset markets, and static expectations were assumed.
Here the model is extended to study the effects of underlying"real" dis-
turbances influencing the current account and to include explicitlypolicy
intervention in a rational expectations framework.
II.B. Asset—maret specification.
To make the analysis manageable, let us consider one country in a
many—country world. We canaggregatethe assets available in this country
into a domestic money stock M, which is a nonearning asset, holdings of
domestically—issued assets B, which are denominated in home currency,and
net holdings of foreign—issued assets F, which are dominated in foreign
exchange)B (for bonds) is government debt held by the private sector,5.
and BC is government debt held by the central bank. Total government debt
B =B+BF (for foreign assets) is the net claims on foreigners held by
the domestic private sector and R is central bank foreign reserves. Total
national net claims on foreigners F =F R.The money stock Misequal to
R + BC, with a 100% reserve system.I assume the initial exchange rate is
indexed to unity, and that the central bank does not permit capital gains or
losses on R to influence N. Similarly, interest income on the central bank's
holding of R is assumed to be turned over to the Treasury so that it does not
affect N. The current account in the balance of payments gives the rate of
accumulation of F over time. The rate of accumulation of B is the government
deficit. N is controlled by central bank purchases (or sales) of B or F
from (or to) the domestic private sector.
The rate of return on F is given by ,fixedin the world capital
market, plus the expected rate of increase in the exchange rate, ê. The
rate of return on B is the domestic interest rate r, to be determined in
domestic financial markets. Total private—sector wealth, at any point in
time, is given by WN +B + eF, so here the exchange rate e, in home
currency perunitof foreign exchange(e.g.$0.50 per DN), translates the
foreign—exchange value of F into home currency.
The total supplies ofBandFto the national economy are given at
each point intime.Each canbe accumulatedonly over timethroughforeign
or domestic investment.2Giventheexisting stocks of B and P at any6.
point in time, the central bank can make discrete changes in N by swapping
either B or F with the domestic private sector; these are open—market op-
erations in government debt or foreign assets.
The demand for each asset by the private sector depends on wealth,
W =N+B+ eF, and both rates of return, r and r +&. Aswealth rises,
demands for all three assets increase. The demands for B and F depend
positively on their own rates of return and negatively on those of the
other assets. The demand for money depends negatively on both r and
r +ê;as either rises, asset—holders attempt to shift from money into the
asset whose return has gone up.
These asset—market equilibrium conditions are sunarized in equations
(1) —(6).






Eauation (4) is the balance sheet constraint, which insures that
m +b+ f1.. The three demand functions give the desired distributionof
the domestic wealth portfolio W into the three assets. Specifyingthe as-
set demand functions as homogeneous in wealth eliminatesthe prive level
from the asset—market equilibrium conditions. Given the balance sheet7.
constraint (4),andgross substitutability of the three assets, we have
the constraints on partial derivatives of the distribution functions:
+ r br <0: m— + b f <0.
Here a subscript denotes a partial derivative. The three narket equili-
brium conditions (l)—(3) contain twoindependentequations given the bal-
ance sheet constraint (4). In equation (5) the bar over B indicates that
the total supply of government debt is fixed.
II.C. Asset accumulation and the current account.
Equations (l)—(6) provide the specification of asset markets in the
model. The other main building block of the model is the current—account
equation. The balance—of—payments accounts provide the identity
F E+ .X+ r(F + R) EX+ rF.
where X is net exports of goods and non—capital services in termsof for-
eign exchange. Net exports depend on therealexchange rate e/p, private
sector wealth W, (given by equation (4) above), and an exogenous shift
factor a which represents real events such as changes in tastes in tech-
nology, oil discoveries, etc., which increase net exports for given values
of e/p and W. Thus we can write
XX(e/P, W, z); X >0,X. <0;X >0.
The sign of Xe assumes theMarshall—Lernercondition holds; X1 reflects
wealth effects on import demand.
Substitution of the function for net exports into the balance—of—
payments identity gives us the equation for accumulation of national net8.
foreign assets:
(7) FX(e/p, W, z) +F.
It is important to note that open—market swaps between the central bank
and the domestic private sector have no direct effect on W or F in (7).
Andtheeffect of accumulation of national net foreign assets through a
current—account surplus (t> 0)on W andFis the same regardless of the
distribution of F between F and R.Since an increase n R, ceteris
paribus, increases the money stock, which is part of W, any increase in F
viii raise W by dF independently of the split between F and R. Thus the
central bank's intervention policy will have no effect on how a current—
account balance moves F and W in (7).
The effect of an increase in F onin (7) is unclear.
with X <0and r >0.Below we will conveniently assume that F/T =0;
it will quickly become apparent why this is convenient. In Branson (1981),
the case where F/aP <0is analyzed.
Equations (l)—(7) plus the assumption of rational expectations (or,
more precisely, perfect foresight in this non—stochastic model) give us a
complete dynamic model in F and ê. Price dynamics are suppressed, but we
will discuss below exogenous price movements as delayed response to mone-
tary shocks.
II.D. Solution of the model.
Solution of the model proceeds as follows. First, the rational expec-
tations assumption is that ê is the rate of change of e. Then two equations9.
of (l)—(3), with wealth substituted from (4) can be used to solve for r and
as functions of M, W, The ê and F equations then are two dynamic
equations in e and F that can be solved for the movement in these two
variables.
Divide equations (1) and (3) by W and differentiate totally, holding
r constant:
(8) d() =mdr+ m.dê
'-p
=fdr +fdê W r e
These can be solved in matrix form as:
(9)(r\ [L _m.] (d(—_)\
rêfrmé) L mj\
Thesolution for dé is then
(10) dê = rê
frd* +
Thecoefficients of eF/W and M/W are the partial derivatives of the é
adjustment function,
(II) ê —(-—-,) ;
>0; <0.
This is the dynamic equation to be solved along with (7) forto obtain
equilibrium e and F.
In the e, F space of Figure 1, the ê =0locus is a rectangular
hyperbola. This can be seen by observing that in 4, eF enter multiplica—
tively (in W as wal]. as the numerator pl), so changes in e andF thate
Figure 1:
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hold the producteFconstant will hold ê constant. CombInations of e and
offthelocus move e away from it, as the arrows show. For examDle,
since > 0an increase in e or F from a point on the locus makes
ê >0.
An increase in M/W, holding eF/W constant, ou1d shift the =0
locus in Figure 1 up. This would be the result of an expansicnary open—
market operation in the government debt market withdBC >0,and no
change in R or F. An Increase in e.1/W, holding M/W constant,will
shiftê =0do; this could result from an open—market swap between F and
B. An expansionaryopen—market operation inthe foreign asset market, with
the central bank altering reserves by exchanging N for F withtheprivate
sector, would shift e= 0up both by increasing M/W and reducingeF/W.
This willprovidethe difference between intervention in the bond or
foreign—asset markets in the model.
For given values of z and P in the F equation (7), theF0 locus in
e, space is a horizontal line at the e value where X—rF. This is
shownin FIgure 2.Ife ISabovethis value, the current—account is in
surplus andF > 0. Insection III wewillintroduce a "leaning against
the wind" exchange—rate policy in which the authorities attempt to reduce
the extentof jumps ntheexchange rate,but not to reverse them. Thus
weruleout herethepossibility that the monetary authority "over—
intervenes," and asse that the sign of F is the same as the sign of F;
this is the same as assuming Ikl<II.Thisessentially asses that the
authorities permit themarket toguide the system towardsits long—run
equilibrium,but perhapsslowthe movement. The assumption gIvesthear-
rows showing movement in Figure2; above—0,F>0, below it isnegative.11.
Anincrease in z in(7) willshiftthe F0 locus down.Giventhe
assumption that X + r0, te extentofthe shift is simply given by the
effect of a change in e on X:
de 1
F=0
If zrises, increasing X and giving a current account surplus, e must fall
(currency appreciate) enough to restore the original value of X. An ir
crease in P will shift 0 up, with
de —i
dp .
Equilibriumof the system is shown in Figure 3. There is one saddle—
path into the equilibrium shown by the dashed line. For a givenvalue of
F, it is assumed that following a disturbance, the market vii]. pick the
valuefor ethat puts the system on the saddlepath toward equilibrium.
Thesystem would have quite different properties under a policy regimeof
ovarinterventicn" that reversed the pattern of movement in the horizontal
direction.
II.E.Reaction to Exogenous Shocks.
II.E.lNonetarv disturbance.
Consider an (unanticipated) expansionary open—market operation in
government debt. This initially leaves Wand Funchanged.There are two
etremeassumptions on price adjustment to consider: no changein P, or
dP/P =di/iediately.
With no change inPas M increases, the F =0locus in Figure 4 does
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rate jups (currency depreciates) from initial equilibriumE0 to on
the new saddlepath. This establishes ê <0as needed for asset—holders
to hold the existing stock of F given the lower iiiterest. rate. The
rise in e/P generates a current—account surplus, and F rises with e fall-
ing toward E2. This is an etexneform of"overshooting."
Suppose the domestic price lve1iediate1y reacts by rising by the
same proportion as the monet stock. Then F =0also shifts up by that
same proportion. The extent of the upward shift in ê =0depends on ini-
tial portfolio distribution and the degree of substitutability among F,
M, and B.One borderline case would be N e and m =f.Itcan be r r
seen in the expression for dê in equation (10) that in this can a pro—
partial increase in e will maintain ê =0.To the extent that N >eFor
>1r1'the ê =0curve would shift up more than F =0,requiring
"overshooting't and ê <0,F >0moving to equilibrium. The reverse ini-
tial conditions would yield "undershocting" with ê >0, <0in the
movement to equilibrium.
II.E.2. Real disturbance.
The effect of an unanticipated fall in z (or an increase in P) is
shown in Figure 5. The decrease in competitiveness shifts t= 0up from
its initial intersection withê0atE. The exchange rate jumps
(currency depreciates) from to E1, and then gradually rises to E2as
F falls. The depreciation of thecurrency restores current—account bal-
ance (t= 0).The model"undershoots" in response to real disturbances.13.
II.E.3. Sluggish price adjustment.
A limiting case of sluggish price adjustment could be modelled as a
combination of Figures 4 and 5. Expansionary monetary policy would begin
this process illustrated in Figure 4. The delayed price response would
then resemble Figure 5. To the extent that the price response is logged
and unanticipated, the e, F point would followapath illustrated in
Figure 6. Quicker price response or anticipation would straighten the
path to E2, which may be to the right or left of E0 depending on initial
portfolio distribution and substitutability.
II.F. Conclusions and empirical implications.
It is convenient to summarize here the basic conclusions from the
analysis so far.
1. Unanticipated changes in money, the price level, or under-
lying real conditions should cause a jump in the exchange
rate toward the new rational—expectations saddle path.
2.Thus weshould expect to see correlation betweenunantici-
pated movementsin e and M, X, and P in the data. Some
initial evidence was presented in Branson (1981); more is
presented below.
3. Movement of the exchange rate following a real disturbance
is likely to be monotonic, while monetary disturbances are
likely to produce "overshooting." Lagged price adjustment
makes "multiple overshooting" possible. This can be seen
in a combination of Figures 4 and 6.14.
II.G. Interest—rate control as an alternatIve to money—supply control.
In interpreting the empiricalresultson exchange—rate policy in sec-
tion V below, it viii be convenient to have a version of the model in which
the monetary authority manipulates its holdings of government debt in order
to hit an interest—rate target, and uses the interest rate as the instru—
ment of monetarypolicy.Here we take r as exogenous, fixed by policy,
and permit B/W and M/W to vary as necessary to hold r at its target value.
To solve the model under a regime of interest—rate control, we make
r exogenous and M/W endogenous in equations (8) above, and then solve for
d& and d(M/W). This yields an ê equation in the form
eF
(12)e=*(—V—, r), *1>0 ;*2>0.
The interest rate simply replaces M/W here.
The ê0 locus is still a rectangular hyperbola in e, F space. A
reduction in r, implying an increase in M/W and decrease in B/W, shifts
the ê =0locus up. Thus Figure 4 provides a qualitative description of
the effect of a reduction of the interest—rate target in a regime of mone-
tary control. The etfects of movement in the interest rate on the path
of the exchange rate are clearly the same as the effects of the corres-
ponding change in M/W in the model with monetary control.15.
III. "Leanins Aainst the Wind" as Exchange Rate Policy
III.A. Introduction.
There is already ample evidence that monetary authorities have gen-
erally tried to slow the movement of exchange rates. This type of inter-
vention has long been characteristic of U.S. domestic monetary policy; in
Branson (1976) I labelled this "leaning against the wind" as exchange
rate policy. Artus (1976) and Branson, Halttunen and Masson (P2) (1977'
presented evidence that German monetary policy responded to movements
in the exchange rate in this fashion. B} (1977) estimated a reaction
function of the for-rn czLe + ...,with< 0 for Germany. As the ex-
change rate rose (1DM depreciated), the money supply was reduced (relative
to its trend). Amano (1979) describes Japanese monetary policy as attempt-
ing to stabilize the exchange rate similarly. U.K. exchange rate policy
was discussed briefly in OECD (1977), where a regression of the form
=$Ae+ ...,withr the minimum lending rate (R) arid 8>0 is reported.
This suggests that when sterling depreciated (e rose), the NLR was increas-
ed as a policy reaction. More recently, Mussa (1981) has presented a tho-
rough review of exchange—rate intervention which is consistent with a
"leaning—against—the—wind" model.
The purpose of this section of the paper is to characterize policy in-
tervention in terms of the model of section II, to prepare for interpre-
tation of the empirical results in section V below. The objective is not
to evaluate policy; it is to describe it. The main difference from the
-previousmodels is the description of intervention as instantaneous and
discrete changes In asset stocks via open—market operations to reduce the
size of discontinuous jumps in exchange rates. This type of policy be-
havior is discernable in the "innovation" correlations in section V below.16.
'e will begin with the descriptfon of monetary policyreaction to
real dIsturbances via open—market operations in governmentdebt or for-
eign assets. Then we study sterilized interventionin the foreign asset
market.
III.B. Monetary poli.
Consider a real disturbance to the current accountthat shifts
F =0up, (rise in e) to restore equilibrium.This is illustrated in
Figure 7, where in the absenceof policy intervention, the exchange rate
would jump from the initial equilibrium E0 to and then depreciate fur-
ther to E2. If the central bank tightened money byselling bonds to the
public, holdingF initially constant, the ê =0curve in Figure 7 would
shift down as shownbythe dashed ê =0.This would shift the saddle
path down to the path running to E2,and reduce the exchange—rate jump to
E1. Thus instantaneousintervention would reduce the initial jumpin e.
This would be an unexpected change in N,since the originating shift in
z and X was unexpected. Sc this typeof intervention could reduce the
variability of e over time.
If the open—market operation were done inthe foreign asset market,
a smaller quantitative intervention
would give the same shift in ê =0
and in the saddle path in Figure 7, becauseeF/W in equation (8) would
rise. In addition, sinceP would rise, the initial jump would be to a
point on the new saddle path below E1.
Thus intervention on the foreign
asset market would, in a sense, be moreefficient than open—market opera-
tions in thebondmarket. This is essentially the sameresult that is ob-







In a mode]. with interest—rate control, the same result as the bond—
market open—market operation of Figure 7 could be obtained by an appropri-
ate increase in. the interest rate target. The necessary increasein
could be reduced by performing the open—market operation inthe foreign
asset market.
III.C. Sterilized Intervention.
There is by now ample evidence that central banks intervenein the
foreign exchange markets but attempt to prevent theintervention from
changing the path of M. The literature was citedin Whitman (1975); more
recent results are discussed in Obstfeld (1980) (1982).In terms of the
model of section III, this is an open—market exchangeof foreign assets
f or bonds by the central bank, withLB—eLF' initially. The result is
again a downward shift in ê =0,as in Figure 7, plus an outwardshift in
F. Thus the jump in the exchange rate is to a point below E1, sinceF
increases. This presents the possibility for interventionthat does not
move the path of the money supply.
III.D. Monetary disturbances.
Shifts in asset demand functions on the foreign interestrate would
shift the ê =0locus, and the exchange rate would follow a pathsuch as
that of Figure 4, at least initially. Either monetaryor sterilized inter-
vention could reduce the extent of the shift in 0, reducing the jump
in e. The central bank would vary the suppliesof the three assets to
meet, at least partially, shifts intheir demands by the public. Again,
this is astraight—forward extensionof "leaning_againsttheWind" policy
reaction from thedomestic to the international markets.18.
III.E. Emnirical Irirolications.
The principal empirical implication of the present model of policy
intervention is that we should observe the intervention in the correlation
of unexpected movements or "innovations" in exchange rates with innova-
tions in money and/or reserves. Nonetary intervention would give a nega-
tive correlation between exchange—rate and money innovations. Interven-
tion with interest—rate control would give a positive correlation between
exchange—rate and interest—rate innovations. If the monetary intervention
is done in the foreign—asset market, a positive correlation between
exchange—rate innovations and reserves would result. Sterilized interven-
tion would give the reserve—exchange rate correlation without a money—
exchange rate correlation. Thus we can study the correlation matrix of
innovations in section V below to infer hypotheses about policy behavior.19.
IV. The Data
IV.A. Introduction.
The asset—market model of section II implies that unanticipated ex—
ogerious movements in the money stock, the current—account balance,and re-
lative price levels will cause unanticipated jumps in the exchange rate.
The intervention model of section III implies that unanticipated
jumps in exchange rates can cause unanticipated changes in the money stock,
reserves, or interest rates. Thus innovations in money or interest rates
may have a positive or negative correlation withinnovations in exchange
rates. If the correlatIon is negative, the inferred hypothesis would be
that the underlying model is a monetary reaction function. A negative
correlation between reserve and exchange—rate innovations would indicate
exchange—market intervention. In this and the following sectionof the
paper we see that the quarterly datafor the U.S., Germany, Japan, and the
U.K. can be interpreted in this framework. We are inferring testable hypo-
thesis from the data in this exercise.
In this and the next section, we study relationships of movements in
the exchange rate of each country, measured by the effective exchange
rate as defined by the IN,with movements in money stocks,current—account
balances, relative prices, reserves, and interest rates.The purpose is
to see what policy stance is implied by the data. Thedata are described
in detail in Table 1.
The first step in analyzing the data is to investigate their time—
series properties. This provides a compact descriptionof the "facts,"20.
andan initial indication of whetherthe facts are roughly consistent with
the theory. The time—series analysisof the data is done in this section.
Then in section V we study systems of vectorautoregressions, one for each
country, to test the relations betweenunanticipated changes, or "innova—
tions," in the variables.
IV..B.Time series analysis.
In this section the autoregressive structureof each time series is
described by regression equations of the form:
I 3
(12)X =o.+ I .X .+Zs.D. +yt + u
t0 it—i . t
1=1 J120a
Table 1: VAR3LEDEFIITIONSAD DATA
1. Variable Name
e effective nominal exchange rate, in units of o.reigncur-
rency per unitofhome currency as computed by the I1T.
Note that this definition is the inverse of e in sections
II and III.
P/P relative wholesale prices (ratio of home to coetitors
indices).
narrow money, as defined by the fl in the International
Fnancia1 Statistics (IFS).
broad money, as defined by the fl (Ml plus quasi—money)
in the IFS
CAB current account balance.
IS short—term interest rate, fromIFS




FederalRepublic of Germany Jan
III. Data
1.All dataarequarterly, from ff sources (in most cases from
IFS)and cover 1973:IV to 1980:IV.
2. Exchange Rates: e isthelog of theaverageeffective exchange
rate during quarter t.Theunits are foreign currency perunit
of domestic currency. The indexisbased on a geometrically
weighted average ofbilateralrates between the home and 13 other
industrial countries. The weights are the sane as those used to
calculated P/P. Base: 1975 =100.Source: flif. Note that these
are not the RNratespublished in IFS.
3.Relative PrIces: The index isa log of the ratio of home to for-
eign quarterly wholesale prices indices. P is acompositeand
uses the sane weights ase does (see above). Base1975.
Source:IP. Thisindex isnotthe sane as that published in the
IFS. Our data isbased onindices In local (not a cocn)
currency.
6. Money: This is the log of the end of the quarter money stock.
Source: IFS, line 34 ("money") for Ml, lines 34 and 35 ("money" +
"quasi—money")for M3.
5. Current Account: ThIs Is the dollar value of the flow during the
quarter(not measured inlogs). Source: IFS, Lines: 77aa
(Merchandise:Exports,fob); 77ab (Merchandise: Imports, fob);
77ac(Other Goods, Services, and Income: Credits): 77ad (Other
Goods, Services, and Income: Debits); 77ae (Private Unrequited
Transfers);77ag (Official Unrequited Transfers).
6.Short—termInterest rate: Data are taken from IFSasindicated
intheTable on"Money Market and Euro Dollar Rates."
Source: IFScountrypages: U.S. andU.K.,line 60c; Germany
and Japan, line 60b.
7.Reserves: These are the dollarvalue ofreservesmeasured at
end of period.Source:IFS line ld.d. These series did not
vary significantlyfrom the seriesadjusted forvaluation
changes provided by the IMP.22.
whereX is the log of the time series under consideration, X .is
t t—1
its value lagged i quarters, D1 is a seasonal dummy, and t is time.
Equation (12) is a univariate autoregression of the variable X on its
ownpastvalues, and the estimatedvalues of the a coefficients give the
patternof response of the timeseries toa disturbance u. The twocases
thatwill prominently appear in our data are first—order autoregression, where
onlyis significant, and second—order autoregression, where a1 and a2
aresignificant. One purpose of the analysis is simply todescribe the
data; the second is tosee if the time—series structure of the exchange—
rate data is consistent with that of the other data.
For each variable we began with a regression on four lags, seasonal
dummies, and a time trend. We then shortened the lags by eliminating in-
significant variables at the far end of the lag. The results are shown
in Tables 2 through 5, one for each country. Each column in the tables
shows the results of a regression of the indicated variable on lagged
values of itself. Coefficients of the time trend and seasonal dummies
are not shown. The regressions are performed on quarterly data for the
period 1973—IV to 1980—IV. The beginning date was chosen because it was
after the major period of disequilibrium adjustment in 1971—73, including
a major real devaluation of the U.S. dollar, and the
last date was the most recent for which data were available when we began
the study in June 1981. The regressions were run using the jogs of e.x—
change rates, relative prices, and money, and the levels of the current—
account balance, interest rates, and reserves. The current—account and
reserves are bothtimeseries that pass through zero in some cases.23.
IV.C.Country results.
IV.C.1. United States
The results for the U.S. are instructive, andserveasan illustra-
tion of the technique. In the first twocolumnsof Table 2, weshowthe
regressions for the log of the U.S. nominal effective exchangerate e,
weighted by the IMF, in foreign currency per dollar. Thefirst column
shows the regression with four lags on the exchange rate; onlythe lag at
t—l is significant with a coefficient of 0.86. When the lags att—2
through t—4 are eliminated, the standard error of theestimated equation
falls a bit, and the coefficient of ei is 0.78. Thus theU.S. effective
rate, measured as a quarterly average, can bedescribed as a stable first—
order autoregression (AR1).Thecoefficient of 0.78 in et_l indicates
that a given disturbance will eventually disappear from the time series




The thirdand fourth colt.ns ofTable2 show the results for the log
ofthe U.S. relative price index PIT. This is an indexof the 'U.S. WPI
relative to a weighted average of the WPI's of thirteenother industrial
countries. The variable PIeP istheff's measure of relative cost, pub-
lished in the International Financial Statistics.It is the inverse of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first regression for P/P in Table 2 gives significant coefficients
to the lags at t—l and t—2. Elimination of the longer lags results in the
second equation, with a standard error only slightly larger than the first.
The result for P/P is a second—order autoregression (AR2), with a stable
cyclical response to a disturbance.3
The next two pairs of columns in Table 2 show the univariate auto-
regression results for the two U.S. money stocks. In both cases only the
lag at t—l is significant. Both are stable first—order autocorrelations.
The next two columns in Table 2 show the autoregressions for the
current—account balance. These are run on the level of CAB, rather than
its log, since the time series passes through zero. The result is similar
to that for the money stocks.
The next three columns in Table 2 show the autoregressions for the
U.S. short—term interest rate. All four lag coefficients are significant
in the first column. In the second regression, with just lags at t—l and
t-2, the second is completely insignificant. Beyond t—l, the important
lags are at t—3 and t—4. The last of the three regressions includes only
the lag at t—l; the standard error is clearly higher than in the four—lag
regression. Rather than include in the VAR system for the U.S. in section25.
V four (or triore) lags on the interest rate, which would greatly reduce
degrees of freedom, I decided to include only the lag at t—l. The
last two columns of Table 2 show the regressions for U.S. reserves. Only
the lag at t—l is significant, giving a stable first—order autoregression.
In the case of the U.S., then, money stocks, the balance on current
account, reserves, and the nominal effective exchange rate all follow
stable AR]. processes. This suggests that the behavior of money stocks,
the current—account balance, reserves, and the exchange rate are consis-
tent, at this level, with the theoretical model of section IIand III.
The relationships between interest rates and relative prices, and
the exchange rate is more complicated. With relative prices following
an AR2, there is at best a loose relationship to the exchange rate.This
is consistent with the evidence of high variability in PPP in Prenkel
(1981). The higher—order process for the interest rate suggests that it
is being moved by all the exogenous variables simultaneously, rather than
reacting systematically to, or causing directly, the exchange rate.
IV.C.2. West Cerman.
Table 3 shows the univariate autoregression results for Germany. The
format is exactly the same as for the U.S., so the discussion can bebrief.
As in the U.S. case, the nominal effective rate, the money stocks,
and the balance on current account all follow AR1 processes in Germany.
£1]. but M3 are stable. German M3 has a lag coefficient of unity,indicat-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The German relative price series is AR2 with a stable cyclical response
to disturbances.4The Ger-man interest rate is AR1 with a lag coeffi-
cient close to unity. Reserves have a barely significant lag at t—3, but
but can be approximated by a stable AR1. Thus the impression from the
German data is similar to the U.S., except for the additional possibility
that the interest rate is used as a policy instrument to control move-
ments in the exchange rate.
IV.C.3. United Kingdom
The U.K. results are suarized in Table 4. Both the nominal effec-
tive rate and the Ml money stock in the U.K. have coefficients of unity
on the t—l lag, indicating that they follow a random walk. The relative
price series is AR2, as in the U.S. and Germany, but with a stable mono—
tonic adjustment response to disturbances.
In the first regression for the current—account balance, there are
no significant lag terms. Thus the U.K. CAB is best described as random
around the path described by the trend and seasonal dummy terms. This
suggests that the innovations in the CAB in the U.K. should not be inter—
preted as conveying information about future movements in the exchange
5 rate.
Both the interest rate and reserves in the U.K. follow second—order
autoregressions, with stable cyclical responses to disturbances. This







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Theresults for Japan are summarized in Table 5. There we see major
differencesfrom the other three countries. The nominal effective ex-
change rate, the relative price series, the current—accountbalance, and
theinterest rate are all AR2 with stable cyclical response patterns.
The two money stocks are AR1 with unitary lag coefficients.Reserves in
Japan follow a complex autoregression of at leastthe fourth degree.
Comparison of the first two reserve regressionsin Table 5 shows the im-
portanceof the lag at t—4. To conserve degrees of freedom in the
Japanese VARsystem reportedin section V, I used the first—order approx-
imation.6Thus in the Japanesecase the time—series behavior of the
exchangerate is consistent withthat of relative prices, the current ac-
count, and the interest rates, but the exchangerate does not follow the
random—walk pattern of money.
IV.D. Suiarv on the data.
The univariate autoregressions of Tables 2 through5 provide a use-
ful aridcourpact description of the 'facts." Comparingthe country results,
we see several common points.
1. All weighted relative price series aresecond—order
autoregressions with stable responses toshocks. All
but the U.K. series are cyclical.
2. All the money stocks are first—order autoregressions,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 3. The U.S. and German e.xchange—rate and current-account
series are first—order autoregressions, and the Japanese
are second—order. Thus these movements in exchange rate
are consistent with movements in the current—account bal-
ance, while the U.K. CAB contains no information about
its future path.
4. The U.S. and German exchange—rate and reserves follow AR?
processes that could reflect intervention. The U.K. and
Japanese interest rates and exchange rates follow consis-
tent processes, AR]. and AR2respectively.
28.V. Emirical Results Using Vector Autoregression
V.A. Introduction.
A useful technique for studying the relationships between the inno-
vations in money, the current account balance, relative price levels, in-
terest rates, reserves, and the exchange rate is vector autoregression
(VAR). Here each variable of a system is regressed against the lagged
values of all variables (including itself) in the system, to extract any
information existing in the movements of these variables. The residuals
from these "vector autoregressions" are the innovations —theunantici-
pated movements ——inthe variables. e can study the correlations of
the residuals to see if they are consistent with the hypotheses implied
by the theory of sections II and III. The vector autoregression techni-
que is introduced and justified by Sims (1980). A clear exposition is
presented in Sargent (1979). Interesting and instructive applications
are discussed in Taylor (1980), Ashenfelter and Card (1981), and Fischer
(1981).
Here I estimate systems of VARsforeach of the four countries, the
U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Japan. Two systems were estimated for each
country. Both include the effective exchange rate e, the current account
balance CAB, and the effective relative price PIP, the interest rate IS,
and reserves R; the difference between the twoisthat one includes Ml
and the other M3. Anobviousextension of the research would be to in-
clude cross—country effects, particularly of money stocks, but also the
other variables. The difficulty in proceeding in this direction comes
from the limited number of quarterly observations: 29 from 1973—IY to30.
1980—IV. Each VARincludeslagged values of four variables, a time trend,
and three seasonal duies. In order to expand the analysis, I am pre-
sently moving to a monthly data base.
Before estimating the VARs, one must consider the issue of the timing
of the data. The effective exchange rate can be computed from public in-
formation on a daily basis. In fact, a UK effective rate is published
daily in the Financial Times. Our data are averages during the quarter.
The effective rate used here is the inverse of e as defined in sections
II and III. Money stock data are available on a weekly basis, so they
are roughly contemporaneous with the exchange rage data. Our money data
are end—of—period. We would expect from section II that the weekly changes
in N would generate nearly simultaneous movements in e. Thus the innova-
tion of the average e over a quarter would be most closely connected in
our data with the innovation of the end—of—quarter money stock, which is
the cumulation of the weekly innovations. Reserves are also end—of—period
data, so that intervention to slow an unanticipated jump in e would appear
as an innovation in reserves.
The relative price data are quarterly averages of monthly data, which
become known soon after the month finishes. Thus in our data set1 the in-
novation in e would be most closely connected to the innovation in P/Pr.
Interest rates are also quarterly averages, so that if the interest rate
were used to control the exchange rate we would see a correlation between
the innovations in e and in IS.
On the other hand, the data on the quarterly balance in current ac-
count are not announced until well into the following quarter. Thus to31.
the extent that the innovation in CAB signals a change in the equilibrium
real exchange rate, it is the innovation in
CABt 1 that moves et.
The VAR residuals to be correlated, then, are those ofet (P/)
CABi. IS, and R. We will use ato designate residuals from the VARs.
The variables in each VAR system are listed in Table 6. The number of
lags included in each variable was determined by the univariate autoregres-
sion of Table 2 through 5. This constraint provides a convenient way to
limit the number of regressors and conserve degrees of freedom. A next
step in research would be to re—estimate the VAR systems with additional
lags to see how much information is lost by application of this constraint.
After the VAR systems are estimated, we correlate their residuals to
study the relationship among innovations. The correlations are givenfor
the systems with Ml and M3 in Tables 7—14 below, two for each country.
Each table includes the correlation coefficients among the VAR "innovaton"
and in parentheses the probability of that correlation occurring under the
null hypothesis that the true correlation is zero.
In discussing the correlations, we will focus on
the correlations particularly relevant for analyzing exchange—rate de-
termination and policy. Detailed discussion of all the results would be
far too tedious.
V.B. United States
The correlations of VAR innovations for the U.S. are shown in Tables
7 and 8. Remember that here the effective nominal exchange rate is de-
fined in units of foreign exchange per unit of home currency, the inverse
of the theoretical definition of sections II and III. So here an increase
in e is an appreciation.Table 6: Variables Included in Vector Autoregression Systems
U.S., Germany U.K. Japan
inei in ei in ei
in Mtl in Mt_i in et2
in in I'1'_ in ' in in










Note: Two VAR systems were estimated for each country, one
with Mi, one with Mi. The equations are estimated on
data 1973IV —1980 IV (described in Table 1).
31aTable 7; Correlations of Innovations From U.S. Vector
Autoregression System With Ml
e Ml PIP CAB IS R
e 1.00.30.42 —.12.09 .14
(.11) (.03) (.55)(.65)(.46)
Ml 1.00 —.35 —.41 —.03—.56
(.06) (.03) (.87) (.QO)a
PIP 1.00 .44 .24 .26
(.02)(.20) (.17)





a. Anentryof.00 indicates the numberwasless than.005.
31b.Table 8: Correlation of Innovations From U.S. Vector
Autoregression System With M3
M3 P/P CAB IS R
e 1.00 —.48 —.37 —.08 —.02 .24
(.01) (.05) (.68) (.92) (.22)
M3 1.00 .23 .05 .50 .07
(.24) (.81)(.01) (.73)
P/P 1.00 .38 —.03 .03
(.04) (.89) (.90)






Thefirst rows of Tables 7 and S give the correlations of exchange—rate in-
novations. The negative signs for relative prices and money are consistent with
innovations in those variables driving e, as in the model of section II. There
is a weak correlation with reserves, consistent with intervention. Innovations
in reserves, shown in the last columns of Tables 7 and 8, are positively corre-
lated with innovations in CAB, but not in money. It is useful here to recall
thatthe CABislagged one period, so that the correlation isbetweenthe re-
sidual CABt1
and R. Thus the indication in Table 7 and S is that intevention
comes at thepointwhere the CABannouncementwould move the exchange rate, not
during the period in which the actual CAB occurs.
The underlying vector autoregression for e (not sh here) also
shows a strong Granger—causal role for lagged CAB. Thus the hypothesis
I would infer fromtheU.S. data is as follows. Thecurrentaccount,
money,'and relative prices all move theexchangerate, the latter two
throughmarket expectations and innovations. Monetary policy is essential-
ly oriented toward domestic targets; movement in the exchange rate is a
sideeffect.The U.S. moneta authorities intervene and sterilize, but
donotfollow a tight rule. This shows up inthestrong correlation be—
R and CAB, and in the correlation between R and e.
V.C.Germany
Theinnovation correlations for Germany are shownin Tables9and 10.
In thefirst row of both tables we see a very strong negative correlation
betweenexchange—rate and re1atveprice innovations. This could come
from exchange rates causing prices, or vice versa, but through innovations
and market expectations rather than a tight PPP relationship. The corre-
lations of exchange—rate innovations with short—term interest rates and reserves
(in the Ml system) must reflect leaning—against—the—wind policy both in termsofTable 9: Correlation of Innovations From German Vector
Autoregression System With Ml
e Ml. P/P CAB IS R
1.00 .17 ..,44 .27 -.48 .40
(.37) (.02) (.15) (.01) (.03)
Ml 1.00 .02 .25 —.47 .28
(.94) (.19) (.01) (.14)







32a.Table 10: Correlation of Innovations From Ceriran Vector
Autoregression Syst With M3
e M3 PIP CAB IS R
1.00 —.09 —.59 .03 —.52 —.26
(.63) (.00) (.90) (.00) (.17)
M3 1.00 .18 .20 —.53 —.04
(.34) (.30) (.00) (.84)
PIP 1.00 .25 .05 .45
(.20) (.79) (.01)






interest rates and intervention. The negativecorrelation of the inter-
est rate and CAB innovations suggests that interest—ratepolicy may re—
spond to the state of the CA.Baswell as to the exchange rate. The lack
of correlation between money and reserves or exchangerates indicates
sterilized intervention. The correlation between CAB andR also supports
the intervention hypothesis.
Thus the German data suggest fairly strongly asituation in which
(a) price and exchange—rate innovations go together,and (b) the author-
ities react to exchange—rate and current—accountmovements through changes
in interest rates and sterilized intervention.This is consistent with
the earlier results of B (1977) and of Herring—MarstOn(1977) for the
fixed—rate regime.
V.D. United Kingdom
The U.K. correlations are shown in Tables11 and 12. The exchange—
rate correlations with interest ratesand reserves are a strong indication
of leaning_agairist_thewifld interventionand interest—rate policy. This
effects.Ml but not 3, as can be seen in thecorrelations of M with e
and R. Innovations in the current—account balancehave the positive cor-
relation with e that would come from the theoryof section II. Perhaps
this suggests that while from theunnivariate autoregressions of section
IV, CAB innovations have no predictivecontent, the market thinks theydo.
In both tables there is a strong negativecorrelation between the
CAB innovation and the interest rate.This would be consistent with
interest—rate policy determined byCAB as well as the exchange rate, simi—
lar to the German case. The U.K. datathus show influence of CAB on e,Table 11: Correlations of Innovations From United Kingdom
Vector Autoregression System t.ith Ml
Ml CAB IS R
e 1.00 .46 —.05 .29 —.59 .53
(.01) (.81) (.12) (.00) (.00)
Ml 1.00 .09 —.34 —.37 .52
(.62) (.07) (.05) (.00)
P/P 1.00 —.02 .06 —.03
(.91) (.74) (.89)





33a.Table 12: Correlations of Innovations From United Kingdom
Vector Autoregression System 'v.'ith M3
e M3 P/P CA3 IS R
1.00 —.04 —.04 .47 —.55 .44
(.82) (.85) (.01) (.00) (.02)
M3 1.00 .05 .46 —.30 —.15
(.79) (.01) (.10) (.43)
1.00 .05 —.05 —.04
(.80) (.81) (.85)






with interest—rate and intervention policy reacting to innovations in e
and CAB with Mi unsterilized.
V.E. Japan
Theresults for Japan are shown in Tables 13 and 14. Let us focus
on Table 13 first. The correlation of innovations in the exchange rate
and interest rate suggest a system of interest rate control with policy
targets other thantheexchange rate, rather than reaction to exchange
rates as in the U.K. and Germany. The correlations of the interest rate
with relative prices and the CAB suggest that these might be the targets.
The reserve correlations with the exchange rate and CAB strongly sug-
gest "leaning—against—the—wind" intervention, with the central bank ob—
sorbing part of the CAB innovations to reduce movement in the exchange
rate. The lack of correlation of Ml with reserves on the exchange rate
indicates sterlization.
An interesting story emerges from the Japanese correlations. They
suggest that policy sets interest rates with CAB and P/P among the objec-
tives. The interest rate moves the exchange rate, as in section II, and
the authorities intervene to, in a sense, neutralize this effect. They
also attempt to sterilize N]. from all of this.
The VAR system with M3 is consistent with this story in term.s of
signs of correlations, although significance levels vary from the Ml sys—
tm (in both directions —seethe correlation of IS and CAB).
V.T. Suuniary of VARResultson Policy
An interesting view of how the monetary system and interdependence
have worked in the 1970s emerges from the VAR innovation correlations.Table 13: Correlations of Innovations From JapanVector
Autoregression System With Ml
e Ml P/P CAB IS R
e 1.00 —.06 —.08 —.03 .55 .33
(.77) (.68) (.89) (.00) (.08)
Ml 1.00 —.10 —.07 —.18 .23
(.59) (.71) (.36) (.24)
P/P 1.00 —.32 .42 —.05
(.09) (.02) (.81)





34a.Table 14: Correlations of Innovations From Japan Vector














































My interpretation, or inferred set of hypotheses Is as follows.The
U.S. sets monetarypolicy,largely by controlling quantities, with do-
mestic objections most in mind. The market looks to innovations in
money and relative prices, and levels of the current—accountbalance,
to set the U.S. exchange rate. The monetary authority attemptssteri-
lized intervention occasionally.
In Japan, interest rates are set withrelativeprices (or rates of
inflation) and the current—account balance among the leading objectives.
Interest—rate innovations move the exchange rate, but an attempt is
made to neutralize this effect through sterilized intervention.
Movements in the U.S. and Japanese effective rates, caused partly
by fundamentals and partly by policy, are mirroredinstantaneously in
the U.K. and German effective rates, and their policy reacts.The re-
action appears as "defensive" interest—rate movements sensitive to
exchange—rate and CAB innovations, and largelysterilized intervention
in the foreignecchangemarket. Thus a consistent story in which do—
mestiGally—oriented policy in the U.S. and Japan istransmitted in the
U.K. and Germany is consistent with the VARinnovationresults.
One final issue appears in the relations among exchange—rateand
interest—rate innovations. The correlation in theU.S. is negligible,
while in the U.K. and Germany it is strongly negative.An implication
is that innovations in the dollar prices of the DMand Sterling should
be negatively correlated with innovations in theU.S.—German and
U.S.—U.K. interest differentials, as noted by Frenkel (1981).The36.
hypothesis advanced there was that nominal interest rates and exchange
rates were both reacting to changes in inflation rates. The alternative
hypothesis provided here is that U.K. and German interest rate innova-
tions are policy reactions.1.
FOOTNOTES
1.Since the analysis here applies to any single country in the interna-
tional financial system, I use the terms 'home' and 'foreign' to denote
the country being discussed and the rest of the system, respectively.
At the level of generality of this discussion no damage would be done
if the reader substituted U.S. for 'home country', 'dollar' for 'home
currency' and 'Fed' for 'central bank'.
2. Since F is home claims on foreigners less home liabilities to foreign-
ers, an asset swap which exchanges a claim and a liability with a f or—
eign asset—holder is a transaction within F, changing claims and lia-
bilities by the same amount. This transaction would leave F and B un-
changed. The reason for using this particular aggregation will become
clear when we study dynamic adjustment below. Basically, we want to
define net foreign assets consistently with the balance of payments and
national income and product accounts, which record the capital account
balance as the change in U.S. private holdings of net foreign assets.
The assumptions outlined above make N and B non—traded assets. This
implies that the total stocks of N, B, and F in domestic portfolios
are given at any point in time.
3.The characteristic equation is given by
—1.36P/_1 +0.60 P1'1't2 =0.
The roots of this equation are .68.371,with a modulus of
0.77 =0.61/2.2.
4.Note that the German price equation would not invert due to multico—
linearity with more than two lags.
5.A moving average specification of the equation for the U.K. CAB was
also experimented with, with no improvement in results. The U.K. CAB
does seem to be random about its trend.
6.The Japanese VAR results were re—estimated using a four—quarter lag
on reserves, without much change.References
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